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The BAROMETER L6 a .6.tudel1.t ne.w6papVt 60ft :the exchange 06 idea).) and 
i n60Jtmation eoneVtning the development and impftove.mel1.t 06 the pft06e..6-
.6iol1.ai enviftonmel1.t at NPS and within :the U. S. Navy. 
GUEST EDITORIAL 
The following is excerpted from the editorial page of the New York Times, 
April 8, 1971: 
'" VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. -- One too often remains silent on issues ,,,hich gnaw 
the vitals of his being. Along with a multitude of others I have long de-
plored the continuing decline of our country's prestige. Now, the disgrace-
ful trial and conviction of Lieutenant Calley removes any reticence to offer 
cons tructive criticism of our government. 
In February, 1965, I was one of two task group commanders who launched the 
first sustained strikes on North Vietnamese targets and shortly thereafter 
became the commander of Task Force 77, commanding all of the U. S . Navy 
aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. It was during this latter period that 
a feeling of utter frustration permeated my staff and my entire command. 
Although we were successful in interdicting North Vietnamese rai l lines and 
inflicting costly damage on the enemy, we were restrained to carrying out a 
campaign which seemed designed not to win. 
In the spring of 1965 a photographic reconnaissance plane returned to the 
flagship with photos which were immediately identified as a sur f ace-to-air 
missile site. This was the first clear proof that SAM sites were under con-
struction. That same day the planning members of my staff and I flew to 
Saigon to confer with the Commander, 7th Air Force, and to plan a joint Air 
Force/Navy strike against this first site, which was not yet completed. The 
joint plan was proposed through the chain of command and, after what seemed 
an inordinate delay, the proposal was returned disapproved. 
Such a refusal was beyond my comprehension. It was feasible to have 
destroyed this site and all others still under construction which were 
ultimately completed. It was not until the North Vietnamese had shot down 
some numbers of our aircraft that our combined air forces were permitted to 
strike back at these, now well-established, defensive sites. Since then 
approximately 115 of our planes have been destroyed by surface-to-air missiles 
launched from pads which I believe could have been destroyed at a minimum risk 
before they became operational. 
Since departing the Southeast Asia area in the summer of 1965, and con-
tinuing on past my retirement, I have witnessed the constant deterioration of 
morale within our great country. We have been disrupted internally by 
external sources and to some extent by well-meaning individuals and groups. 
Our youth have resorted to mild and stronger narcotics to show a defiance 
of what? Thev are not really sure. 
As a nation, we failed by not declaring war in the traditional manner, by 
not relying on the inherent patriotism of our people to see this great country 
through to an early decision. Rather, we relied on a "resolution" which carries 
none of the force, the restraints or the sacrifices required by a declaration 
of war. 
This mess is not the responsibility of this Administration. It is that of 
ye ars of national fear aided and abetted by so-called intellectuals within and 
outside Government circles. No amount of rhetoric, expounded by self-styled 
pundits, can erase the simple fact that we have not won this conflict only 
because we, or our leaders, did not try to win. 
Now we are going through a period of "gradual withdrawal." Perhaps this 
is necessary to buy more time in which to equip and further train the South 
Vietnamese armed forces. But, if that is not the whole story, and our Govern-
ment truly believes that we must withdraw gradually to protect our men during 
withdrawal we are, again, not willing to use the power which is at our disposal. 
The President of the United States could, with credibility, say to the North 
Vietnamese Government: 
"We will immediately commence a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from 
South Vietnam and will complete this operation by the end of 1971 -- provided 
North Vietnam withdraws her forces to the north of the DMZ and does not interfere 
in any manner with such a withdrawal nor commit any act of aggression against 
South Vietnam until the withdrawal is finally completed and, provided, that all 
prisoners of war are immediately rehabilitated to their homeland. Should North 
Vietnam violate these provisions in any manner whatsoever, I will direct the 
air forces of the U.S. to destroy completely Hanoi, Haiphong, all other principal 
centers of industry and all dikes and dams in North Vietnam." 
The peoples of all the world can understand such language and it is my belief 
that Hanoi would respond favorably. 
It is time for this ugly little conflict to end. It is not time to criticize 
and punish little people who have fought for their country believing such fighting 
to be in our best national interest. 
I join the multitude of former military men who say: "I have killed because 
I was ordered to and because I believed that by so doing I might have shortened 
the time our country and our men were exposed to danger. I have ordered bombing 
against targets which unavoidably must have contained civilians; I would do it 
again if my country so ordered." 
To compare the ridiculous trial of a young lieutenant to the Nuremberg trials 
is as fallacious as any argument could be. To bring out what a frightened young 
lieutenant might have said to a group of psychiatrists is the most unjust thing 
I have ever seen printed. 
Lieutenant Calley may not have been a hero, but he represents that sort of 
young man who has always been the salvation of our nation when the chips were 
down. He should be pardoned from this unjust sentence at once. 
Edward C. Outlaw 
******************** 
E ciwMd C. Ouil.aLV -0~ a Jte:tiJr.e.d Jte.M aclrnUz.a.t 06 :the. u. S • Navy 
altd a c.o M u..Ual1t il1 the. ae.Jto.6 pac.e. il1dU6bLy. Ii 
EDITORIAL COMMENT 
The specific incident described by RADM Outlaw illuminates one facet of the pro-
fessional environment in which the Naval officer operates. When he states that the 
refusal of the joint strike plans was beyond his comprehension, what does this imply? 
The Naval War College was founded to promote the study and development, in a 
systematic, orderly manner, of the art of war as applied to the sea and contiguous 
land areas. The mission of NPS is to conduct the advanced education of Naval 
officers. Does either institution now prepare the Naval officer to comprehend 
what, six years ago, RADM Outlaw found incomprehensible? If not, must this 
comprehension be acquired by OJT, or at the other extreme, has the professional 
Naval officer no choice but to remain incredulous in the face of similar decisions 
by higher authority in the future? 
ONE MAN'S OPINION 
In the June, 1971, edition of the Naval Institute Proceedings, the editor recites 
his experiences with Vice Admiral Rickover in response to the March, 1971, Prize 
Essay by Captain R. H. Smith, USN. Admiral Rickover made three telephone calls to 
the editor in quick succession containing the following items: 
Tele~hone Call I: The Prize Essay was the first good article in the Proceedings 
" 1n t e past 20 years, even though the Proceedings was "a useless rag which prints 
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nothing but meaningless euphoric history. articles by young officers who don't 
have enough experience to know what's happening in the Navy, and worthless 
advertisements." 
Telephone Call II: The editor of the Proceedings should have a staff member 
research Admlral Rickover's testimony in the Congressional Record if he wanted 
to find out and print what is really wrong with the Navy. 
Telephone Call III: Admiral Rickover had called Captain Smith to congratulate 
hlm, and had been informed by Captain Smith that the Proceedings had changed the 
sentence concerning Admiral Rickover from "the cantankerous 'vision' of an 
Admiral Rickover -- whose fundamental message, if we trouble ourselves to learn 
it, is no less than how to go about building a modern Navy the right way -- is 
a hundredfold virtue" to read "the cantankerous 'image' of an Admiral Rickover 
." This proved Admiral Rickover's contention that the Proceedings censors 
its art; cl es. 
Having also enjoyed Captain Smith's article, the editor of the BAROMETER thought it 
might be interesting to conduct the research recommended in Admiral Rickover's 
second te1ephone call, at least insofar as it might relate to NPS. Here is what 
he said about postgraduate education in 1964: 
l, It is my opinion ... that the Navy Postgraduate School located at Monterey, 
Calif., is largely a correctional institution for the academically deficient. 
Some graduates of this institution, after 3 years, have received the equivalent 
of about one year of what would be considered true graduate work at a good 
engineering college. Only about 20 percent of courses at Monterey are considered 
to be fu11 graduate-level courses. 
In this regard, an interesting anomaly exists in the Navy today. Opponents 
of my efforts to make the Naval Academy a first-rate educational institution 
are equally outspoken proponents that every Naval Academy graduate should 
receive "postgraduate" schooling. This may not sound like an anomaly until 
it is recognized that it now takes two years of this so-called postgraduate 
schooling for an Academy graduate to achieve the equivalent of a baccalaureate 
degree in an engineering or scientific field from a good engineering college. 
As a result, what the Navy is really saying is that they need officers with 
meaningful college degrees. This is inadvertent recognition that Naval Academy 
graduates are not qualified for true graduate-level education. 
I recommend that the academic standards of the Naval Academy be raised so 
that its graduates will be qualified for graduate-level education, and that full 
advantage be taken by the Navy of graduate courses offered at leading colle~es 
throughout the country. The so-called Naval Postgraduate School could then be 
phased out over a period of time, commensurate with implementation of Naval 
Academy academic improvements. . . ,I 
Admiral Rickover's testimony continued to make the following points: 
1. Advantages of civilian institutions over NPS: 
a. Infusion of civilian thought and experience in the officer corps, 
and resultant inhibition of parochialism normally bred by military life. 
b. Greater variety of courses available and academic standards "automatically" 
kept at national levels. 
c. Likelihood of reduced costs. 
d. Another nonessential part of the Navy Shore Establishment eliminated. 
2. Duty assignments within field of postgraduate study! 
a. Few officers with postgraduate schooling ever assigned where practical 
use can be made of these specialties. 
b. Graduate schooling has become an end in itself. 
c. Working in technical specialties doesn't seem to fit into the desired 
Navy career pattern. 
d. No need for a doctoral degree for a line officer in the Naval profession. 
e. Money sa'/ee: by a~o'~ :i~l'lr:l t'lE' rioct('lral program could go toward improving 
the Na",,,, ~ Academy fdCLA~ ~ /. 
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f. Graduate education in "international relations, political science, 
business administration, management, etc.," should be given to officers 
at the senior command/junior captain levels. 
In 1970, Admiral Rickover testified as follows about postgraduate education in the 
Navy: 
II There is no question that today postgraduate education is being used 
primarily as a device to retain officers in the Navy. The facts and 
statistics can support no other conclusions. In the past, postgraduate 
education was provided by the Navy to officers who had completed several 
years of sea duty and whose academic background and performance warranted 
the expense and effort of additional formal education. Courses were offered 
in subjects relating directly to the needs of the Navy, courses where officers 
possessing such additional education were required to operate the Fleet. Today 
this has all gone by the board. The requirements a naval officer must meet 
today to be eligible for postgraduate education are so lax that anyone can 
apply and be accepted. As you know, the Navy's postgraduate program is run 
in conjunction with a number of civilian colleges. If a naval officer applies 
for postgraduate education at one of these civilian colleges, there is no 
assurance he will be academically acceptable. If he is not, and many fall into 
this category, the Navy solves the problem by sending him to its own postgraduate 
school at Monterey • • . 
Postgraduate education in the Navy has become another milestone or "require-
ment" in the career advancement of all naval officers. Present naval personnel 
policy expects every officer to have attended postgraduate school before he 
reaches the rank of Lieutenant Commander. It makes no difference if the 
individual officer wants it or not -- he is expected to program postgraduate 
schooling into his selection of duties. This means that attending the school 
becomes a necessity. For those whose duties do not permit attending the 
postgraduate school, it means a black mark, a hindrance to promotion. This 
is what has happened in the nuclear submarine program. 
Due to the scarcity of young officers qualified in nuclear submarines, it 
has not been possible to provide all of them the opportunity to attend 
postgraduate school. These officers are the top in the Navy academically 
and are far better qualified to pursue postgraduate study than any other 
group of naval officers. But •.. it is not possible to send many of them 
to school because their services are vitally needed to man the nuclear ships. 
However, since the Navy has set a quota for the PG school (sic), it assigns 
officers of lower caliber to the school. The mere fact that the lesser-
qualified officers have attended PG school makes their records look better. 
It also makes no difference whatsoever what degree the officer gets -- it has 
no bearing on what he has done or will do subsequently in the Navy. A number 
of studies have been made on this; they show that most of the graduate studies 
have little relation to the needs of the Navy; that they are mostly useful in 
preparing the young officer to leave the Navy. 
I should point out that this graduate education is not cheap. It costs the 
taxpayer a total of over $70 million a year to provide it to naval officers and 
to those in the other services. It amounts to $16,000 to $22,000 per year per 
officer -- exclusive of his pay and allowances. • . . In my opinion few jobs 
in the Navy require a graduate degree. There are some, but I would generously 
estimate this to be less than 10 percent of what we now provide • • • I have 
talked with many officers who have attended these schools. They all say they 
enjoyed the opportunity for two or more years away from their work. But they 
admit they didntt learn very much that is of use to them in the Navy ••.. 
If a graduate degree is necessary as a prestige item then I suggest (authorizing) 
the Naval Academy to grant every graduate a masters or even a doctors degree 
immediately upon graduation. At any rate it will have about as much merit or 
prestige as a Masters Degree from the postgraduate school at Monterey has today; 
it would cost much less and would ~erve the Navy's needs just about as well. " 
EDITORIAL COMMENT 
Vice Admiral Rickover has achieved a world-wide reputation as the putative father 
of the nuclear submarine. As such, he enjoys an exceptional rapport with the Armed 
Services and Appropriations Committees, and has routinely been given a free rein in 
his testimony. Whether they emanate from a cantankerous vision or cantankerous 
image, the comments nonetheless have not to date been dignified by either public 
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disclosure or public comment by any part of the NPS community. Such reluctance 
to come to grips with less than complimentary statements, regardless of source, 
may be viewed as a strength, but it can also be interpreted as tacit acceptance. 
By default, then, failure to address Admiral Rickover's remarks, point by point, 
to determine their truth or falsity goes a long way towards establishing their 
credibility. If the facts are other than stated in the testimony, and we believe 
this to be so, where may the substantiating documentation be found? The BAROMETER 
would welcome a rational response to Admiral Rickover's impassioned testimony. 
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NPS BAn.or~ETER QUESTIONNAIRE 1-72 (STUDENTS ONLY) 
GRADING SYSTEM 
1. Academic quarters at NPS: 
a. 0-4 
b. 5-$ 
c. 9-12 ________ __ 
d. Greater than 13 
'- 2. Curriculum enrolled in 
3. r'ly QPR to date is 
For the following questions, indicate your response using this key 
1 Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3 Ho opinion 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
4. The present grading system at NPS is satisfactory 
5. The present grading system is a positive motivator, 
i.e. it increases my desire to excel. 
6. The present grading system provides a meaningful 
measure of my achievements at NPS. 
7. The present grading system averages all grades, and makes no 
provision for retaking a course in order to remove a 
" failing " grade from the QPR. This is a proper method 
of grading. 
S. One proposal for a revised grading system recommends the following: 
n. Honors to indicate truly outstanding performance (1 in 10, 
for example) 
b. Credit to indicate satisfactory performance 
c. No Credit to indicate failure to achieve satisfactory perfor-
mance 
d. Eo credit ( IncoflLlete) to indicate the existence of unusual 
circumstances illness, etc.) 
This proposal, if implemented, would be an improvement over 
the existing grading system 
9. A Pass/Fail (Credit/Eo Credit) system would provide an adequate 
measure of student capabilities and would provide me 
with sufficient motivation 
Upon completion, please place this questionnaire in the cardboard 
box provided for it in the sr'lc, or return to SIVIC .f 2734. 
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
I?ErJIARKS 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: The questionnaire and certain additions made by the BAROMETER 
are enclosed. Please fill out the questionnaire (students only, please) and return 
them to the box in the Student Mail Center. 
Assistant Professor Gary TUCK of the OA/Admin. Sciences Department wrote concerning 
two specific problems he had encountered: the mutilation or outright pilferage of 
periodicals from the library and the dangerous/illegal maneuvers of bicycle riders 
in the traffic pattern between NPS and La Mesa Village. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Concur in your comments, Professor Tuck. Such performance does 
not reflect creditably on the asserted uniqueness of this student body, 
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